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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the State of Utah 
I. R. S'TRINGHAM, J. S. SMITH, .J. D. 
GARDNER, CENTRAL LAND C·O·M-
PANY, a corporation, UTAH l\10TOR 
PARK, a corporation,· IV A PARKIN, 
E. F. ZEYER, L. 0. HUNTER, ART 
J. CARTER, FRED MUSE, IVY RAE 
PITMAN~ E. A. CHAJ\fBERLIN, 
FRANK B. BOiWERS, MRS. DEAN 
R. DAYNES, ~IRS. HUGH. W. LAW, 
KENNETH E. SMITH, GLEN C. 
BILLS, ALBERT P. HOLT, LEWIS 
HUl\fPHRIES, GOMER 0. TH0·1\1A·S, 
UTAH CREDIT CO., a corporation, 
CAPITOL CHEVROL.ET CO., a cor-
poration, .HOME ACCEPT·ANCE COR-
PORATION, a corporation, and JOE 
JOHNSON . , 
' A ppellJarnts, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE CITY, a municipal corpora-
tion, - ~ 
Respondent. , 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF F·AC.TS 
This app·eal is taken from an order· of the Honorable 
A.' H. Ellett, one of the Judges of the Third Judicia1 Dis-
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trict Court of the State of Utah, sustaining respondent's 
demurr:er to and dismissing appHllants' complaint as 
amended and as is set forth in appellants' brief on pages 
3 to 14, inclusive. 
App1ellants' complaint sought to restrain respondent 
from enforcing an orde·r issued by the Board of Com-
missioners of Salt Lake City, respondent herein, pur-
suant to the provisions and authority of Section 5720 
of the Revised Ordinances of ·Salt L·ake City, Utah, 
1944, requiring appellants and others ·similarly situated 
to remove certain street signs as described in said com-
plaint and which S·ection 57·20 of the Revised Ordinances 
of Sa'lt Lake City, Utah, 1944, is se~t forth in full on 
pages· 14, 15 and 16 of appellants' brief. 
Appellants contend that the court erred in sustaining 
the demurrer to and orderirig_ the dismis;sal of their com-
plaint for the· reason that ·S·ection 5720 of the_ Revised 
Ordinances of Salt Lake ·City,- Utah, 1944, is void hecaus:e 
it contains no stan·dard or rule to guide the.commission-
ers of S·alt Lake City or the public in the matter of 
removal of signs and for the further reason that the 
order given was arbitrary, capricious and yoid because 
not supported hy any re·ason, logic, lawful classification 
or legitimate objection and under this last re·ason appel-
iants ~also contend that no valid order was given to 
app·ellants by respondent to remove said signs. 
RESPOND·ENT''S ARGUMENT 
I 1t is respondent's position -that appellants did not 
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set forth facts sufficient to warrant the trial court in 
granting the relief therein prayed for ·and that the trial 
court 'vas justified in entering its order sustaining re-~ 
I 
spondent 's demurrer and ordering the dismiss~al of appel-
lants' complaint upon appellants ' failure and r•efusal 
·.,), 
to amend their said complaint or otherwise plead in said 
action. 
Respondent in advancing its position in the fore-
going matter and in answer to appellants' brief hereto-
fore ·filed 'vith your Honorable Court herein sets forth 
its argument under siX points, e'ach of which will be 
discussed s·eparately as follows : 
POIN·TS ARGUED 
I. THE CITY HAS SUFFICIENT PO'WER TO. 
REGULATE OR PREVENT THE INSTALLATION, 
MAINTENANCE OR REMOVAL o·F 'SIGNS· LO-
CATED IN PUB-LIC S!TREETS . 
• II. THE PE-RMIT AND LICENSE GIVEN BY 
THE CITY TO INSTALL AND MAINTAIN SIGNS· 
' IN ITS S'TREET·S IS AT MO:ST A TEMPORARY 
PERMIT AND MAY BE REV·O·KED AT THE WILL 
OF THE CITY COMMISSION. 
ill. THE COURT CANNOT PASS. UPON THE 
WISDOM OF THE CITY COMMISSIONERS!- IN 
MAKING AND ENTERING THEIR ORDER OF 
REMOVAL OF SIGNS IN THE STREETS OF SALT 
LAKE CITY. 
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IV. PROPER NOTICE OF THE ORDER OF 
REMOVAL WAS GIVEN TO E·ACH APPELLANT. 
V. THE ORDER OF REMO\TAL OF SIGNS 
WAS GIVEN TO EACH HOLDER OF A 'PERMIT 
OR LICENSE SIMILARLY ·SITUATED OR LO·CA-
'TED IN SALT LAKE CITY. 
VI. -UNDER CITY'S DELEGATED POWERS 
IT IS N·OT REQUIRED THAT SECTION 5720 OF 
THE REVISED ORDINANCES OF :s~LT LAKE 
CITY, UTAH, 19¥, CONTAIN STAND·ARDS OR 
RULES TO GUIDE THE CO·MMTSSIONERS OF 
S;ALT LAKE CITY OR PUBLIC IN THE MATTER 
OF THE REMOVAL OF LICENSED SIGNS. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE CITY HAS SUFFICIE·N·T POWER TO 
REGULA·TE OR PREVENT THE INSTALLATION, 
MAINTENANCE OR REM0\7AL O·F SIGNS LO-
CATED IN PUBLIC STREET·S.) 
It is conceded by the city that it has no greater 
powers than those expre'Ss_ly granted to it by the St1ate 
Legislature. 
Wadsworth v. Santaquin City, 83 Utah 311, 
28 P. 2d 161. · 
Salt Lake City- vs. Sutter, 61 Utah 533, 216 
P. 234. 
'The Utah State Legislature has se·en fit to delegate 
to the cities located within the State of Utah wide gen-
eral powers in the control of its s~treets. Those s·eetions 
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in the State statutes whi~h will he herein8.fter specifically 
referred to are set forth as follows : 
'•15-8-26. SIGN·S AND ADVERTISING 
:\IATTER. They may regulate or prevent the 
11se of streets, sidewalks, public buildings and 
grounds for signs, signposts, awning8, horse 
troughs or racks, or for posting handbills or 
advertisements.'' 
"15-8-23. CLEANI-NG P R·O P E R·T Y, 
STR,EETS AND SIDEWALKS. They may reg-
ulate and control the use of.sidewalksandallstruc-
t.ures thereunder or thereover; and they. may re-
quire the owner or occupant, or the agent of any 
owner or occupant, of prop~erty to remove all 
weeds and noxious vegetation from such prop- · 
erty, and in front thereof to the curb line of the 
street, and to keep the sidewalks in front of such 
property free from litter, snow, ice an·d obstruc-
tions-.'' -
'' 15-8-11. STREETS-ENCROACHMENTS, 
LIGHTING, SPRINKLING, CLEANING. They 
may regulate the use of streets; a'lle·ys, avenues, 
sidewalks, crosswal_ks, parks and public grounds, 
prevent and remove obstructions and encroach-
ments th,ereon, and provide for the lightjng, 
spri-nkling and cleaning of the s~me.' ' 
'' 15-8-10. TREE;S. · ·They may plant, or direct 
and regulate· the planting- of, ornamental shade 
trees in streets., parks and public grounds.'' _,, 
. ~-
~'15-8-84. ORDINANCES-PUNTSHMENT. 
They may pass all ordinances and rules, and make 
all regulations, not repugnant to 1aw, necessary 
for carrying into effect or discharging all powers 
and duties cohferred by, this chapter, and 'such as. 
I ' 
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are necessary and prop~eT to provide for the safety 
and prese-rve the health, and promote the pros-
perity, iniprove 'the morals, peace and good order, 
comfort and convenience of the city and the in-
habitants thereof, and for the protection of prop-
erty therein; and may enforce obedience to such 
·. ordinances with such fines or penalties as they 
may deem proper; p·rovided, that the punishment 
of any offense shall be by fine· in any sum less 
than $300 or by imprisonment not to exceed six 
months, or by both such fine and imprisonment.'' 
It should be noted that in Sections 15-8-26 and 
15-8-11 th;e city's powers are to regulate an-d prevent 
while in Sections 15-8-10. and 15-8-23, th:ey are merely 
to regulate. S·ection 15-8-84 dele·gates to cities of Utah 
general police powers which· permit and :empower cities 
to enact ordinan<'es to provide fo-r the safety and pre-
serve the health and promote the prosperity,. improve 
the morals, peace and good o~der, comfort and con-
venience of the city and the inhabitants thereof and 
for th:e protection of prop·erly therein. This section will 
I 
be more fully referred to under the argument of points 
II and VI of ifuis brief. 
II. ··T·HE PERMIT AND LICEN'SE GIVEN BY 
THE .CITY TO IN·S'T.ALL· AND MAINTAIN SIGNS 
IN ITS STREET:S IS A·T MOS·T A TEMPORARY 
PERMIT AND MAY BE REVOKED AT THE WILL 
0'F 'rHE CITY C·OMMI1SSIO·N. 
The ca~es general1y hold that an individual can 
acquire no prope:rty right in a p~ublic street and that 
any p-rivate use of ·a p·ubli!c s·tre:et eith:er by a permit, 
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adverse use, or oth,erwise, and for no 1n-atter how long 
a period of tune, is n1erely a pernris.sive right and can 
be terminated and prevented at the· wi~ of the govern-
ing body. The power for such a.ction is VJested in such 
governing body by either a direct grant of power or by 
the police power as is vested in then1 .. 
I 
The case of Palace Garage, et. al., vs .. Oklahoma 
City, an Oklahoma case report,ed in 268 Pac. at p·age 
240, is a leading case frequently cited to sustain the 
city's right under its police powers to ·enforce an ordi-
nance requiring the removal of obstructions from a 
public street. The matter was an appeal from the trial 
court-'s order sustaining a demurrer to appellant's peti-
tion, wherein it was reques.ted that ·the city be enjoined 
from enforcing an ordinance requiring th'e removal of 
service stations located between the sidewalk and the 
curb. The ·State law in Oklahoma granted to cities the 
power to prohibit and prevent an encroachment into and 
upon the s~dewalk!s and streets. Ap·pellant contende·d it 
had certain rights in the parking which was admitted, 
but the court held that the passag.e of the ordinance 
requiring the removal was a valid exercise of the police . 
power of the city and stated as follow~ : 
din exercising the power conferred upon it. 
under the general welfare clause of the statute, 
the city council has broad discretion to Qetermine 
what is necessary for the public welfare, .safety, 
comfort, and convenience of the inhabitants of the 
city. The city council iikewise has a sim]lar dis-
cretion in determining what characte-r of struc-
tul!e may be. ·erected and maintained upon, over, 
or under the streets, alleys, and sidewalks of the 
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city, so iong as such structure does not constitute 
per se a common nuisance. 'A .purpresture is an 
encroachment upon the· street, which the munici-
pality may or may not tolerate at its option, if 
the same be not als·o a, public nuisance.' Ruffner 
v. Phelps, 65 Ark. 412, 46 S. W. 728; Owens & 
Scott v. Town of Atkins (163 Ark. 82), 259 S. W. 
39'6 ( 34 A.L.R. 267) . Under the allegatipns of the 
ap·pellants' complaint, their filling. station, while 
a perpresture, was not a pub1ic nuisance per se, 
because they alleged that it was C()·nstructed with 
all safeguards and prote·ction against· fire, and 
so as not to c:reate any hazard or risk from that 
source, and likewise that its appliances do not 
extend into the street, but are located betWeen 
the sidewalk and curb line of the street, and, there-
~ ore, were not in any sense a public nuisance. But 
notwithstanding these allegations, it was neverthe-
less within the option or discretion of the city 
council to determine whether the welfare of the 
city demandea the abatement of thes!e' structures; 
and unless such discretion was exercised in an 
arbitrary, dis·crimi~atory, and unreasonable man-
~er, or in such manner as to invade the constitu-
tional rights of property, the court wi11 not inter-
fere and declare the ordinance void. ·See North. 
Little R·ock v. Rose, 136 Ark. 298, 206 S. W. 449, 
and cases there cited. 
I 
"The complaint does not contain any allega-
tions .which show that the ordinance is unreason-
able, arbitrary, and discriminatory, or that it in-
vades· appellants' constitutional right to own and 
use their property. The fact that the· city council 
prern~itted the operation of ·other. stations, known 
as 'drive-in stations' which were not situated on 
the street but. on private lo'ts, would not tend to 
show that the ordinance under review was dis-
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criminatory, even though, in order to reach these, 
drive-in stations, it was necessary to drive across 
the side,valks of the city, and even though the 
fire hazard ''""as greater from such stations than 
from the filling station of appetlants. Such 'drive-
in' stations being situated upon p-rivate lots, the¥ 
rannot be brought 'vithin ,the same class as the 
filling station of the app.ellants, which is within 
the bolmdaries of the street. Comparison cannot 
be made between filling stations situated on pri-
vate lots and filling stations situated within the 
boundaries qf the street, in order to determine 
whether the ordinance be discriminatory and un-
reasonable. The right of the city council to· pas:s 
the ordinance under consideration is predicated 
upon the fact that the fil1ing station of appellants 
·is within the street of the city and therefore a 
purpresture, which the council, by an ordinance 
which is not arbitrary, discriminatory or unreas-
onable, ha.s the right to remove.'' 
It was further contended by appe1lant that the curb 
pumps were placed in the parking with the ·consent of 
the city and having exp·ended considerabl~e sums of money 
in the construction of the same they, therefore~ had a 
vested right to keep them there so long as they did not 
become a menace to the life or s.afety of the public; 
the court finding that app;ellant had no such right and 
thereunder cited the ease of Keys:er vs. City of Bois;e, 
165 P. 1121, an Idaho case, wherein the court said : 
'' * * * The authorities dealing with the ques-
tion raised by the demurrer are conflicting, but 
we are of the opinion that the. sounder rule, and 
the rule supported by the better reasoned cases, 
is to the effect that the streets, from side to side 
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and end to end, belong to the p·ublic, and ar.e held 
by the municipality in trust for the use. of the 
public. The city is t~erefore without authority, in 
the absenQe of a legislative enactment expressly 
p·ermitting it, to grant a private· person or cor-
poration a permit to erect or maintain a perma-
nent obstruction in a public stre·et or thorough-
fare for a purely private purpose; we have no 
such statute in this state. It fo1lows that any one 
obtaining a permit from the city for the private 
use of a pu·blic street, a;s in this cas.e, takes the 
same with notice that it is subject to revocation 
at the will of the city, and, indeed, in this view it 
matters not whether the us.e is made in accordance 
with a permit or without one, the· us·e is merely 
permissive in either event, and revocable at any 
· time without notice. If the p·erson making' such 
private use oi a stre-et goes to expense, he does 
so at his own risk, and he will not be heard to 
complain that his prop·erty is· being taken without 
due process of law. 
"The holder of a permit to install an obstruc-
tion in a p:ublic street or thoroughfare, for a pri-
, vate purpos·e, acquires no property. or contractual 
right by reason of the issuance to him of such 
permit, and whenever the city authorities, in their· 
discretion, ·deem it necessary, as a proper police 
measure to vacate ·and revoke such permit, the 
holder ·of the· same has no alternative, but must 
comply with the order of revocation.'' 
The court further stated that any p·ermissive use 
of -the s1treets and parkings would be with the full knowl-
edge of thH statutory limitations on the p:arit of the offi-
cers of the city to grant same and that the:reforo no 
property rights could he acquired from such use of. the 
streets by plaintiff. . 
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In the c.ase of Forbe·s v. City of Detroit, et. al., 102 N.,,r. 740, a ~lichigan case, the plaintiff applied to the 
City of Detroit for a permit to haVle the bay windo~f 
of her building encroach into the street~, which permit 
was granted subject to removal at any time when directed 
by the coinn1on council. As soon as these· windows w-ere 
··con1pleted at great expense the plaintiff receive·d a ten 
days' notice informing her that her permit was termin-
ated and she was to remove fu;ese encroachments. The 
court said: 
• ' The express terms of the license give th·e 
right to the city to terminate it at will, ·and al-
though it would have been better for Mrs. Forbes 
had the counsel not granted it in the first place, 
·thus preventing her from the los:s that she will 
suffer by its revocation, that cannot deprive the 
city of its reserved right, even if its power to 
grant the privilege be unquestioned. The action 
of the council is perhaps s.uhject to some criticism, 
f.or the failure to fully understand and limit the 
proposed improvement in the first instance; but 
there is no indication of bad faith, ·and it was 
commendable that action was taken as soon as the 
misunderstanding developed, instead of permit-
t~ng more expense to be incurred. There is a mani-
fest propriety in denying the privilege· of 'en-
croachment upon streets. While Mrs. Forbe-s is 
a sufferer without apparent fault upon her part, 
we see no way of relieving her.'' 
Rowe v. City of Cincinnati, an Ohio case reported 
in 159 N.E. at page 365, is a case wherein the plaintiff 
prayed for a restraining order ~against the def:endant city' 
from enforcing the provisions ·r.eqniring the removal of 
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gasoline pumps from between the sidewalk and th·e.curb. 
The court said in pa:Vt that the use of the ·street for such 
purpos·e is merely a pe·rmissive use. under a temporary 
license which creates no vested right to use the street for 
an exclusively privat·e business and may at any ti:rri!e· be 
withdr~awn by the city. And further said an abutting 
owner does not hav!e such right of prop;erty in the public 
streets as to· give him the right to app~ropriate a portion 
, of the street permanently to the purposes of his private 
business. Any privilege which the plaintiff in error here-
tofore had or enjoyed by virtue of the pennit from the 
city has no·w been revok~ed. That privilege at most con-
stituted a mere licens-e or pennissive use. ·They therein 
cite·d the case of City of New Orleans v. Kaufman, a 
Louisiana cas·e, 70 ·so. 874, wherein the court said: 
''City ordinance prohibiting the erection of 
sheds, signs, etc., in Napoleon avenue held to he 
valid~ -
''The public right to the use of the street goes 
to the full width of the strHet, and extends in-
definitely upward and downward, 
''The municipal officers may temporarily 
tolerate or p·ermit minor obstructions to the full 
use of the streets which they deem not injurious 
to the rights of the public, hut .such toleration 
may be ended, or permission revoked, at any time 
by the same or any succeeding council. '' 
They also cite the case of Eddy v. Grange-r, City 
TrHasurer, a Rhode Island cas~e r-eported in 31 Atl. at 
page 831, wherein ~the- court said: ''Permission from a 
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1nunieipality to use a public street for a private drain 
is a.t Inost a revocable license, and cannot create a vested 
right to Ina.intain the drain.'' The court therein cites 
several other cases which are very much in point with 
our pr~sent case. 
In the case of Chap·man v. City of Lincoln, a 
Nebraska case reported in 121 N.W. 596, the plaintiff 
sought a temporary injunction from the enforcement 
of a city ordinance requiring- the removal of stands set 
up on the city's sidewalks for the sale of fruits and 
9ther merchandise. The cou·rt held the fact that defen-
dant city in the past has been p·ermitting the:se viola-
tions of its ordinances and the statutes of the state, but 
has now commenced the work of removing al'l obstruc-
tions and may well be construed. as evidence fro in th~ 
fact that it intends to prosecute the good work to a 
final and p-roper conclusion. Nor is the city estopped by 
reason of its failure to enforce the ordinances in the 
• • . • . . I • 
past or by reason of its permission of such violation 
from now insisting upon a strict observance of ils ordi-
nances. 
In th·e case of Union Institution For Savings in City 
of Boston v. City of Boston, a Mass·achusetts. case re-
ported in 112 ~N.~. 637, wherein a t·emporary injunction 
was requested from the enforcement of an order re-quir-
ing the removal of a large street clock. which had been 
installed Un.de·:r permit issued by the city, the court said 
that the contention ''that the erection of the clock under 
this p·ermit constituted a contract which cannot be im-
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paired, as well as a ve-ste·d prop·e·rty Ijght which cannot 
be taken from the ·plaintiff ·except by the power of 
eminent domain,'' necessarily assumes that the board 
or agents of the commonwealth, ·by necessary impli-
cation is authorized by the statute ~to contract to give up 
and s.urrender its and the eommonwealth's control of the 
full use of public highways.. That such authority is not 
implied as necessary to the proper exercise of the power 
conferred is obvious. 3 McQuillan, Municipal Corp. Sec. 
2844. The right gran:ted is not a franchise or a contract, 
but is a licens·e which 1egaliz·es that form of obstruction 
in a public highway which would otherwise constitute a 
. . 
nuisance. 
In the case of Mettler v. City of Ottumwa, an Iowa 
case reported in 19'6 N.W. at page 1000, the cou~t said 
permission granted to the owner of private property to 
use a portion of the street for an areaway may be re-
voked at ~any time in the sound discretion of the council. 
In the cas,e of Robinson v. City of Spokane, a Wash-
ington cas·e reported in 120 P. 101, the court held that 
the abutting owner had no property inte-rest in the trees 
Planted along the highway, saying, it seems clear that 
whatever right the city may have here·tofore granted 
to ab)l:tting owners to plant tre-es in :the street, such right 
was a mere pennissive right or a license which might be 
:r.evoked at any time and ~o vested rights could arise 
# 
therefrom. The city in its legislative capacity might 
exercise this power to revoke the licens,e and cause the 
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removal of any obstruction in the s·treets without lia~ 
bility. 
In Utah I am unable to find any case that has be·~n 
decided exactly in point. However, in the case of Morris 
v. Salt Lake City, reported in 101 P. 373, the court said: 
and 
• ·Upon the n1erits of the appeal, it i'S insisted 
by cotmse1 for the city: That it had the exclusive 
right to establish street and sidewalk grades ; that 
under the statute's ·of this state full power and 
authority over streets is conferred upon cities, 
with the right to grade, gutter, and improve them 
as may seem proper to the city authorities ; that 
the 'sidewalk in que-stion was planned and laid 
strictly in accordance with, ~and pursuant to, the 
powers conferred by the statute; and that, while 
an abutting lot owner may plant trees in the street 
in front of his premises, such trees are neverthe-
less subject to the control of the city, and if, in 
the exercise of its lawful powers, when reasonably 
exercised, it becomes necesary to remove or de-
stroy any trees growing in the street, the city 
may remove or destroy them.'' 
''While an abutting lot owner may therefore, 
p~:ant trees in a str~et in front of his premis·es, 
and may acquire an interest in them which· the· · 
law will protect as against any one who, without 
lawful authority, injures them or destroys them, 
yet, notwithatanding this, the lot owner plants th·e 
tre·es in the street subject to the rights of the 
public.'' 
Also the decision of the Utah Supreme Court in ~the 
case of ·Salt Lake City v. Schuback, reporte-d in 159 Pac. 
2d, 149, sets down the rule that cities may authorize 
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limited use of the sidewalks for the benefit of adj-acent 
property owners, hut :that the . same are at ail times 
subje:ct to the right of control by the cities over the use 
of said sidewalks .. 
Also in the case of Lewis v. Pingree National Bank, 
a Utah case reported in 1'51 Pac. 558, the court held that 
a private person had full power to abate any encroach-
tnent into a public street, ·howeveT t~e same being sub-
j:~ct to modification by a court of equity. If this action 
had been comtnenc·ed by the city rather than by an indi-
vidual I feel the decision would have. required the re·-
moval of ~the encroachment herein referred to. 
· III. THE COURT CANNOT P AS·s UPON THE 
WIS~DOM O·F THE CI'TY CO·M·~fiSSIONERS IN 
MAKING AND ENTERING THEIR ORDER o·F RE-
MOVAL OF S!GNS IN THE s~TREETS OF SALT 
LAKE ·CITY. 
Appellants contend in their argument that the city· 
acted arbitr~arily and capriciously becaus·e its order of 
removal was not supported by any reason, ~ogic, lawful 
clas.sifieation or le-gitimate objective and set out more 
spe~ciflcally u:nder sub-paragraphs (a), (h), (c), (d), (-e·), 
(£), (g), (h), (i) and (j) of paragraph 11 of their com-
pl~aint their reasons why the. city's order of removal 
was disc·riminating and unlawful, and app·ellants further 
contend that it is incumbent Upon the city to. S·et forth 
its reasons ·or findings showing a public nece:s·sity for .the 
use of the streets by the public before such order of re-
moval can issue. · 
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. '\ 
By ~ar the great 'veight of authority and riurnher 
of cases hold that when the city is granted po"r.er to 
exercise its discretion the presumption will be that the 
city has not abused such discretion but has acted in good 
faith for the benefit of the pub!lic. It is further held that 
it is necessary to plead and prove a clear and palpable 
abuse of such discretion on the part of the city to enjoin 
any action taken by it. 
Here the appellants allege nothing in their complaint 
showing an abuse of discretion on the p·art of the city 
but merely state that in appellants' opinion certain facts 
which might require a removal of their signs were non-
existing at the date of the isuing of the order of removal 
by the city. Clearly the courts cannot substitute theirs 
or others opinions or judgment for that of the city'·s, 
t 
the proper and ordered procedur.e. b~ing for ap·p·el~ants 
to convince the city commission in ~a reguJ.ar official meet-
ing that the city had erre·d in the issuance of suc:h an 
order. 
A leading case sustaining this position is that of 
Groover v. City of Irvine, a Kentucky case reporte·d in 
?OO S.W. 904, in which case the plaintiff sought to en-
join the city from is-suing a franchis-e and alleged in his 
petition that the Mayor of the city was interested: in the 
company s·eekiilg the franchise; that he had procured 
his brother to bid on said franchise and that the plain-
tiff's brother was outbid and that still the bid was given 
to the Mayor's eompany. In ans.wer to s·aid peti~on the 
court said: 
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''In granting franchise& for the public bene-
fit, a city council 'acts in a legislative ·capacity. 
In the eX!ercise of this power a discretion is vested, 
which cannot be taken away by the courts. * * • 
However, 'vhen ~the exercis;e of ·the power and 
discretion t~o reject bids is attacked in the courts, 
the presumption will be mdulged that the council 
has not abused its discretion, but has acted with 
re:ason and in good rai~th for the benefit of the 
p·ublic. To p~roceed upon any other theory would be 
to substitute the judgment and discretion of the 
courts for the judgm·ent of the members ·of the 
council with whom the lawmakers have seen fit 
to lodge th·e power. Little Rock Railway & El~c­
tric Company v. Dowell, 101 Ark. 223, 142 S. W. 
165, Ann. Cas. 1913D, 1086. Hence it is incum-
bent on one who calls in question the discretion 
of th·e council to allege and prove facts showing 
. I 
that the council acted arbitrarily or corruptly, 
and was therefore guilty of a cl~ear and palpable 
abuse of dis:cretion. 
''He:ve the soie facts relied on by the. success-
ful bidd~r. are that the hoard of council reje·cted all 
bids., and that the Mayor, who was interested in 
another tele.phone company having a franchise 
in the city; used his influence and s~ecured th~ 
passage of an ordin~ance or resolution undertaking 
to rep,eal the ordinance granting the franchise, and 
to set aside the sale. It is not charged that the 
mayor us.ed any imp!roper or corrupt influence 
over the members of the eoul}.cil, or even that 
their action was induced .solely by such influence 
as he aiJtemp·ted to use. :Therefor~e· the case is. one 
where, notWithstanding the allegations of the· 
ple~~dings, the memhers of the council m~y have 
acted with ~eason and in the utmost good faith. 
That· being true, the faets p~eaded are not snf-
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ficient to show a clear and p~alpable abuse of dis-
cretion on the part of the members of' the city 
council. It follows that the plaintiff did not show 
himself entitled to a mandatory injunction requir-
ing the council to accept his bid, and that the 
chancellor did not err in sustaining the demurrer 
to the petition as amended.'' 
In the case of Ex Parte Stallcups, a Texas case 
reported in 220 s.,\y. 547, the plaintiff contended that 
the city acted arbitrarily and capriciously in eliminating 
certain parking zones and the court said : 
"Why the city council abrogated that particu-
lar stand is not shown, nor has it been shown that 
it was without the power of the city ·council legi-
timately exercis·e. The creation of stands of this 
characte·r and th·eir abolition is .'largely discre-
tionary with the city council. What may operate 
at one time to create the s~d may he not proper 
at another time. T:Qe solution of these matters is 
largely within th,e discretion of the city council, 
and in order to show their unre·asonableness facts 
must be adduced. In a general way it may be 
stated that the authorities hold. that such ordin-
ances are within the power of the city council, 'and 
the· authority conferred upon that governing body 
of the municipal corporation, and unless they vio-
late the Constitution or the general law of· the 
land as enacted by the Legislature, or are un-
reasonable and arbitrary, they wi'll be upheld.'' 
ln the case of Lacey v. City of Oskaloosa, an Iowa 
case reported in 121 N.W. 542, the p1laintiff sought to 
restrain the city froin removing ce·rtain hitching post~ 
from the city stre·ets. The court said: 
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'' The f·ee · rti tle of the streets is in the town, 
and no private person has any legal right to erect 
any structure therein for the purpose of carry-
ing on his private business, and if, having done 
so, he is required to remov.e his building or struc-
ture, or whatever it may be, from the street, he 
has no cause of complaint. He is deprived of no 
right.'' 
The court further said : 
''The limited extent of the obstruction is im-
rnaterial as affecting the right of the city to re-
move it. The fact that, notwithstanding the ob-
struction, there is still ample room left for passage 
of' teams and travelers, 'fill not -exempt it from 
liability to removal wheneve-r orde1~ed . by the 
proper municipa1 authority.'' 
And the court further says: 
''The powers granted to the town are l·egisla-
tive in character, and 'vithin the limits prescribed 
by statute ar.e plenary. The only lllnit upon them 
which the courts have been inclined to recognize 
is that they s·hall not be exercis.ed unr;easonably . 
. The wisdom of a legislative act is not a matte~r 
for judicial consideration or review, nor will the 
courts inquire into the necessity of a change or 
improv-ement in a public street ordered in due 
£orin by municip·al authority.'' 
In the case of Edabtirn v. City of Creston, an Iowa 
cas.e reported in 202 N.W. 580, :the plaintiff sought to 
~njoin the ·city from an order requiring the removal of 
a gas filling station from the curbing of congested stre·ets, 
wherein the court said: 
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'~~City councils are by s,tatute given contro~ of 
the streets of n1unicipalities, a.nd it is their duty 
to In-aintain and keep then1 free from obstructions 
and nuisances. This court cannot pass up'On the 
'Yisdom, or lack thereof, on the parrt of the· city 
council of Creston in the enactment of the ordin-
ance in question, nor do 've perceive any theory 
upon which its enforcement can be properly en-
joined upon the record before us.'' 
In the case of n,rorris v. Salt Lake City, reported in 
101 Pac. 373, the court said: 
''The courts may not control the city in the 
exe·rcise of i1ts rights in making public improve-
ments, nor can the courts _9rdinarily review the 
actions of the city authorities in their determina-
tion of what the improvement shall be and how 
its plans shall be executed. ' ' · 
And further: 
''As a general statement therefore it may 
be said that the law authorizers the- city authorities 
to exercise their own judgment in establishing 
streets or sidewalk grades and· in . formulating 
p'lans for improvements of thwt or any other public 
character .... It· is also clear that the execution 
of the plans adopted may not be arrested or the 
plans reviewed by either a court ·or jury, unless it 
is mad~ to appear th8Jt they were conceived in bad 
faith, or that they are oppressive or clearly un-
reasonable, arbitrary or capricious. '' 
In the case of Broadbent V. Gibson, a Utah case 
reported in 140 Pac. 2d 943, th·e court said: 
' 'A court is not concern.ed with the wisdom 
or policy of t:he law and cannot substltute its 
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judgment for that of the le-gislative body. If 
reasonable minds might differ as to the reason-
ableness of the regulation, the law must be up-
he~·d.'' 
IV. PROPER NOTICE OF THE O·RDER OF 
REM·OVAL WAS GIVEN T·O E·ACH APPELLANT. 
The appellants did not urg.e the first point of their 
argument to any great extent and rightfully so, for in 
paragraph 6 of app·ellants' brief they allege as follows: 
. ' ' 6. Twice during the year 1947 officials of 
the defendant notified groups of the plaintiffs 
that signs on ·parking or curb areas of the ·streets 
of defendant city should he. removed and that per-
mits for a continued use of said signs would not 
be removed. ' ' 
And again in p·aragraph 12 they allege : 
. 
' '12.. This action is brought in behalf ·of all 
persons situated similarly to plaintiffs or any of 
.· them, which p~ersons may join as plaintiffs in this 
cause or have the benefit of this proceeding with-
out joining.'' 
And further, in paragraph ~4 they a~lege: 
',' 14. · D~efendant has given notice to plain-
tiffs and to all- of them that their: existing signs 
muSit be removed on or hefore F~~.bruary 15, 1948, 
and that unless (s'o removed the defendant will take 
action against each ·plaintiff .for ·removal of said 
sign·s. '' 
Certainly based upon the above allegations con-
tainHd in ,app·ellants' complaint, app·ellants cannot now 
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be held to con1plain that they were not given prop·er 
notice of the city's order of removal. 
';· THE ORDER OF REMOVAL O:F ·SIGN·S 
WAS GIVEN TO EACH HO·LDER OF A PERMIT 
OR LICENSE SI~1ILARL Y SITUATED OR L:OC1\.-
TED IN SALT LAKE CITY. 
The appellants furt;her contend that they are being 
discriminated against because owners of signs affixed 
to buildings which project over the public sidewalks and 
owners of areaways located under pub~ic sidewalks were 
not ordered to remove 'Such signs or ·encroachmen~s by 
the city. 
Paragraph 4 of appellants' complaint alleges as fol-
lows: 
'' 4. Each of the plaintiffs is the owner :of a 
sign or -signs_ advertising the busines's of such 
plaintiff and inviting patronage of said business 
from members of the publi-c who travel upon and 
use the streets 'Of ~S·alt ake ·City, and each of said 
signs is situated upon that portion of the public 
streets known ~as the curbing or parking area lying 
and being between the curb or edge of the portion 
of the street us·ed for vehicular traffic and the 
sidewalk or 1the portion used fror pedestrian traffic, 
and each of said 'signs is mounted upon a support 
whjch is affixed to or re-sts upon said portion of 
the public street. None of said signs protrudes 
over or is above ·any portion of any p~ublic street 
· which is customarily us-ed by pedestrians for 
walking, by vehicular traffic for travel or move-
ment, or by any other group of persons except 
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these plaintiffs, who car1e -for the lawn, flowers, 
shrubs., and trees in said parking areas and service 
said signs: as and when service is needed.'' 
And paragraph 12 of said complaint alleges : 
'' 12. This action is brought in behalf of all 
persons situated similarly to plaintiffs or any of 
them, which p·ersons may join a:s plaintiffs in this 
cause or have the benefit of this proceeding wi,th-
out joining.'' 
From the said allegations of appellants' compl,aint 
the trial court must take as an estab1ished fact that all 
owners of the particular type and location of signs 
ordered removed by th~~ city are parties to this action 
and that said order of removal is not being enforced 
· only against a port~on of the group, of such owners simi-
larly located, as inferred by appellants in their brief. 
The law is well established that an order or an ordi-
nance which op~erates uniformly against all those simi-
larly located o-r to a particular class are valid ·and sho:nld 
be· upheld. 
The owners of areaways are in a different class than 
owners of signs, and owners of projection signs located 
over public sidewalks arH in a different class than own-
ers . of signs established on s~dards affixed to the 
ground ·and located between the :sidewalk and curb lines. 
P~e.rhaps a future city commission would in their 
sound discretion prefer to ·eliminate :the p~rojection signs 
and p-ermit the establishm~ent of curb signs but as· has 
been heretofore discussed, such discretion is not to be 
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interfered with or substituted by the discretion of others 
or of courts. 
The Utah Legislature created a disti~ction in the 
curb signs and otl1er structures located over the side-
'valks and therefore placed them in different c'lasses, as 
is shown by the wording of Sections 15-8-23 and 15-8-26. 
In the case of Mettler v. City of .Ottumwa, an Iowa 
case reported in 196 N.W. on page 1000, the court per-
mitted evidence to be introduced to prove. that the city 
council acted arbitrarily when it ordered ap:p,ellant ''to 
remove the areaway and clos_e the opening, and! that dis-
crimination in favor of the owners· of other buildings 
similarly situated and used is shown by the _neglect and 
failure of the officers to order -areaways used in con-
nection therewi~h to be removed. Of course, such action 
of the city council, if shown, would be intolerable. The 
weight of the eVidence, however, t~nds to s·how that 
many areaway;s have already been closed in the business 
district, and that the city council is proceeding, cau-
tiously in the matter, hut requiring each owner to remove 
the obstruction whenever the public exigencies demand 
the space occupied thereby. The ordinance is not_ in its 
terms discriminatory, but provides for, ·and contemplates, 
uniformity of -operation.'' 
In the case of ·City of Pierce v. Schramm, a Nebraska 
case reported- in 216 N.W. 809', the court found against 
the city who made an order :vequiring one owner to 
remove his gasoline pumps from the curb and therein 
said: 
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''·Here those similarly situated are not e-ven 
Inade parties to the suit ·and the defendant is ar-
bitrarily selected out of the group of those similar-
ly situated, and that without any intention on the 
part of the. city of in any manner molesting the 
o:thers, the indication being that had the city pro-
ceeded against all those simiiarly located, the 
action would have been upheld.'' 
In the case of Broadbent v. Gibson, supra, the 
c.ourt said : 
''In determining w hetb:er or not this classi-
fication is unconstitutional, it must he remem-
bered that discrimination is the very essence of 
clas'sification and· is not objectionable unless 
founded upon distinctions which the court is com-
pelled to find unreasonable. 'The legislature has a 
wide discretion in determining what shall come 
within the·clas~s of pe:rmitted activities _and what 
shal'l be excluded. '' 
VI. UNDER CITY'S 'DELEGATED· POWERS 
IT IS NO'T REQUIRED THAT S;ECTION 5720 OF 
THE REVISED ORDINANCES OF SAL~T LAKE 
CITY, UTAH, 1944, CONTAIN STANDARDS OR 
RULES TO GUIDE ·THE COMMISSIONERS! OF 
SALT LAKE CITY O~R PUBLIC IN THE MATTER 
OF THE REMOVAL OF LICENSED· SIGNS . 
. The four~h and last ·point argued by appellants in 
their brief contends th~t Section 5720 of the Revised 
Ordinances of ~alt Lake City, Utah, 1944, is void bec-ause 
~t does not contain standards or rules to guide the city 
commission· or public in the removal of licensed signs 
and in sup~port thereof cite certain cas~e·s. 
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'·The generally accepted rule· i'S. to the effect 
that a statute or ordinance whieh vests arbitrary 
discretion 'vith respect to an ordinarily lawful 
business. profession, appliance, etc., in public of-
ficials, 'vithout prescribing a uniform rule of 
action, or, in other words, which authorizes the 
issuing or withholding of licenses, permits, ap-
provals, -etc., according as the designated officials 
arbitrarily choose, without reference to all of the 
dlas·s to which the statute or ordinance under con-
sideration was intended to apply~ and without 
being controlled or guide·d by any definite rule or 
specified conditions to which all similarly situ-
ated might kno-\vingly conform,- is uncons~ti~­
tional and void." 
T·here are, however, very definite exemptions 'to this 
general rule, one being to the ·effect that it is not always 
necessary that stah1tes and ordinances prescribe a spe-
cific rule of action, but, on the other hand, some. situa-
tions requiring th·e vesting of some discretion in pub~ic 
. I 
officials, a.s, for 'instance, where it is; difficult or imprac-
ticable to lay down a definite, comprehensive rule, or the 
discretion relates to ihe administration of a police regu-
lation and is necessary -to protect the public morals, 
health, safety and ge·neral.welfare. 
Another exception is wh~r-e mere· matters involving 
an exercise of discretion as to details in enforcing other-
. I I 
wise valid ordinances may be left to designated officiais. 
And still another exception is where the discretion 
is with respect to matters of m·ere privilege as where 
the discretion relates to a business, the carrying on of 
'vhich i~ a mere matter of privilege because of a character 
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tending to 'be injurious ·rather than ail ordinary lawful 
business, the carrying on of which croeates a properly 
right or vested interest. Arbitrary ·discretion as to. the 
granting of licenses or revoking of licens·es may lawfully 
be delegated to public officials without prescribing defi-
nite ru1·es of action. 
Section 5720 of the R.evised Ordinances. of Salt Lake 
City, Utah, 1944, definitely com·es under two of these 
exceptions to the general rule; the first beirig that of an 
' 
exercise of police power in the enforcement of said 
ordinances, as has heen more sp·ecifically referred to 
in the case of Palace Garage v. Oklahoma City, supra; 
and also that exception allowing dis·cretion with respect 
to a matter of mere privile·ge, for no one i:u the city of 
Salt Lake Crty has the absolute right to install cr main-
tain signs in the pub1ic streets of Salt Lake City. 
Section 15-8-26 delegates to cities in Utah the right 
to regulate or prevent the use· o.f. its streets for sign 
posts and therefor,e definitely the city has th·e right of 
discretion with r~sp~ect to· the matter· of granting or 
revoking a permit for such use of its stre·ets. 
In 92 A.L.R. at page 410 it is said: 
"As an exception or qualification to the· rule 
stated, it has been held that it is not always 
necessary that statutes and ordinances prescribe 
a sp,ecial rule of action, hut, on the other hand, 
some situations require the ve'S'ting of some dis-
~retion, in public offici·a1s, as, for instance, where 
it is difficult or imprac,ticab1e. to lay down a def-
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inite comprehensive rule, or the disel"etion ·relates 
to the administration of a police regulation and 
is neces·sary _ to protect the public morals, health, 
safety, and general welfaro. It n1ay be n·oted that 
the modern tendency is to be more liberal in pet: 
mitting grants of discretion to administrative 
bodies or officers in order to facilitate the ad-
ministration of laws as the complexity of economic 
and governmental condition increases. '' 
In the case of State v. Cohen, a Ne'v Hampshire 
case reported in 63 ~;\_tl. 928, the court. held: 
'· .... \ statute au·thorizing city officials to license 
persons 'deemed by then1 to be suitable' to he 
junk dealers, and to detepnine and designate the 
places where the licensees were to carry on their 
business, was held constitutional as again·st the 
objection that it granted arbitrary power, on :th·e 
theory that the junk business endangers the pub-
lic morals, safety, and welfare, and that in such 
a c.ase a reasonable discretion may 'be vested in 
public officials. With respect to the provision re-
lating to· determination of the place of busin·ess, 
the court said that the same was nec-essary for 
the protection of the public against the dangers 
of the spread of contagious diseases and of con-
flagration, etc. And upon the question of suit-
ableness of :applicants, see the case as treated.'' 
And in the case of Racine v. District Ct., a Rhode 
Island case reported in 98 Atl. 97, the court said: 
''An ordinance authorizing the city clerk, 
upon the app·roval of the chief of p·o'lice, to grant 
motorbus licenses to individuals, firms, and cor-
porations deeme·d suitable to conduct such bus, 
was upheld as against the contention that it left 
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everything tto the unbridled imagination, caprice, 
discretion, or fancy of the city clerk ·and the chief 
of. police,' ,fue court proceeding upon the theory 
that it will be assumed that there will be no abus·e 
of diseretion, and that the uncontrolled discretion 
arose from the fact it was difficult to define in 
advan0e upon what conditions the permits should 
be gran ted.'' 
In .Crumpton v. Niontgoinery, an ..c\labama case re-
ported in 59 So. 294, the court said: 
''That the selection of the beneficiaries of a 
n1ere privilege, not involving a· matter of right, 
may he co~itted to the· <ijscretion of a body cre-
ated for that purpose, and so without impinging 
upon any vested right of one who desired to en-
joy the privilege, or from whom it . was, in the 
discretion of the body, withdrawn.'' ~ 
In the· case of Newbern v. McCanri, a Tenness~ee 
cas.e reported· in 58 S.W. 114, the court held that where 
the business is a matter of p~vilege and not a matter of 
right and is subject to police regulation, a much larger 
discretion should he given in order to p~rotect the welfare 
of the people. It has been held that a statute authorizing 
township boards to 1icens-e billiard and pool halls:~ when-
ever in the judgment of ·the board it shall be to the best 
interests of .the township, to grant the s:ame, is not uncon-
stitutional on the ground that it grants ~ arbitrary and 
uncontrolled dis-cretion to such township~ boards. 
In the cas·e of Contract Cartage Co. v. Morris, a 
Wash.ington D.C. cas.e reported in 59 Fed. 2d 437, which 
cas-e involved ''a statute limiting the weight and dimen-
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sions of vehicles on the state highways, and empow·ering 
highway officials to grant special permits for limited 
periods for tl1e operation of vehicles exceeding the limi-
tations set by the statute 'vhen in ·their opinion a suffi-
cient en1ergency should exist. It was held that leaving 
the determination of the existence of an emergency to 
officia1 judgment without definition did not amount to 
an invalid delegation of legislative power, the court say-
ing: 'Tl1e word 'emergency' is.used in its plain, ordinary 
signification, and, as defined by the lexi~ographers, me·ans 
or implies a pressing necessity; an unforeseen <?Ccur-
rence or combination of circumstances which calls for 
immediate action or remedy'.' 7 
And in the case of Winter v. Barrett, an lllinois 
case reported in 186 N.E. 113, the co~ said: 
''In enacting laws the legislature cann·ot deal 
with the _details of every particular cas,e, and 
reasonable discretion as to the manner of' ·execut-
ing a law must necessarily be given to administra-
tive officers. Such officers, in the performance 
of their duties, are frequently called ~upon to 
exercis,e judgment and discretion, to invesltigate 
and decide, and yet in doing so they do not ex-
ercise judicial power. within the meaning of the 
Constitution.'' 
In the case of Thompson v. Smith, a Virginia case 
reported 154 S.E. 579, the court said: 
' 'Mere matters of detail within the policy and 
the legal.princip'les and sitandards ,established by 
th~ statute or ordinance may properly be left to 
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administrative discretion; for· the determination 
of such matters of detail is more ·ess.entially min-
isterial than legislative. In declaring the policy 
of the law and fixing the 1legal principle-s and 
standards which are to control in the administra-
. tion of the law, genera1 terms which get precision 
from the te-chnical knowledge or sense and 'experi-
ence of men and thereby becom·e reasonably cer-
tain may be used; and an administrative officer 
or bureau may be inv.ested V\rith the power to as-
certain and determine whether the qualifications, 
facts, or conditions comprehended in and required 
by such ge'neral terms ·exist, and whether the 
provisions of the law so fixed and declared have 
been complied with in accordance with the gener-
. ally accepted meaning of the words.'' · 
And in the ease of Southern R. Co. V. Com .. a Vir-
ginia case r'eported in 167 S.E. 578, it is stated: 
''A statute authorizing the statJe highway 
commissioner to require railroads in the state to 
build overhead crossings when in his opinion 'such 
would be necessary for public safety or conven-
i~ence W8JS held not to be a delegation of 'legislativ:e 
powers .. The court stated that, whil·e the legisla-
ture is ·the source from which legislation must 
come, if a statute sufficiently indicates legisla-
.tive purpose, and has merrely left administrative 
details to some agent, it is not invalid, the court 
further remarking that a legislature does not ·sit 
continu·ously, and must necessarily work with and 
through som,e such instrumentality.'' 
And in the ease of State ex r~l. v. Milwaukee, a 
Wis.consin case reported in 240 N.W. 847, it was held: 
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·"That in so ·far as an ordinance authorized 
revocation of licenses by the mayor 'whenever he 
shall consider it necessary or expedient for the 
good order of the city so to do,' the city council 
had left to the mayor only the administrative 
function of ascertaining the existence of facts be-
cause of which revocation is necessary or ex-
pedient for such good order, ·and that the delega-
tion of the power of revocation was not void as 
failing' to fix a standard for th~e mayor's action 
and thereby amounting to an unconstitutional 
delegation of legislative powers -to a quasi judicial 
officer. In this case, the mayor had revoked a 
license issued under the ord;inance in question 
pennitting the conduction of a Marathon dance.'' 
In the case of Ex Parte Graham, a California case 
reported in 269 Pac. 183, the court h·eld that a delegation 
of power to municipa1 boards or officers to _grant and 
refuse permits to engage in occupations and businesses, 
which are proper subject of police surveillance- and regu~ 
lation, will be sustained, though involving discretion, on 
theory that such officers will not use powers· villianously 
or for purpose of oppression or mischief. 
Utah apparently follows the exception to the gen-
eral rule in matters with respect :to discretion of me-re 
privi~ege, for in the case of Eureka City v. Wilson, 15 
Utah 53, 48 Pac. 41, and affirme'd by· the United State-s 
Supreme Court in 173 U.S. 3'2, 43 L. ~d. 603, the court 
held that the moving of buildings. on public streets has 
been held to be a special privilege which can be arbitrar-
ily controlled so that a municipality• can by ordinance 
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make the granting of pennits rest upon the discretion 
of a public official without prescribing a rule of action. 
Also s·ee the case of Kenyon Hotel ·co. v. Oregon 
Short I_Jine, a Utah case reported in 220 Pac. at page 
382. 
C·ON·CLUSION 
The order of the trial court in sustaining the gen-
eral demurrer and its further order dismissing the com-
plaint of appellants for their failure and refusal to amend 
said complaint, or otherwise plead, should be sustained. 
Respectfully submitted, 
E. R. CIIRISTENSEN, 
City Attorney 
HOMER HOL·MGREN, 
A. PRAT·T KE'SLER, 
Assistant City Attorneys. l 
A ttO,'f"'l'leYS ftorr Respo'flilent. ·~ 
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